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In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), 1  Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded for himself that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)’s minimum coverage 
provision—the so-called individual mandate—was beyond the scope of Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  He further concluded that the provision was unjustified by 
Congress’s power to pass laws that are necessary and proper to carrying into execution other 
concededly valid regulations of interstate commerce, such as the ACA’s requirement that 
insurers cover individuals with pre-existing conditions.2  Pivoting dramatically, however, the 
Chief Justice then held for the Court that the minimum coverage provision was a permissible 
exercise of Congress’s tax power. 3   As Roberts pivoted, so changed the fate of the most 
consequential piece of American social welfare legislation in nearly half a century.4 
Some defenders of the ACA’s constitutionality responded by praising the Chief Justice’s 
judicial statesmanship, political savvy, and personal courage.  For example, Jeffrey Rosen 
reported in The New Republic that “liberals found themselves in the unexpected position of 
applauding Roberts for his act of judicial statesmanship,” as “he set aside his ideological 
preference to protect the Court from a decision along party lines that would have imperiled its 
legitimacy.”5  Jeffrey Toobin, writing in The New Yorker, celebrated “a singular act of courage” 
of “a professional Republican” who “was disappointing those closest to him.”6  David Von 
Drehle of Time Magazine, invoking King Solomon’s offer to split the baby, wrote that Roberts 
had “vindicated the virtue of compromise in an era of Occupiers, Tea Partyers and litmus-testing 
special interests.”7  
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Constitutional critics of the ACA were less congratulatory.  Some responded by 
condemning Roberts’s legal infidelity, political motivation, and personal cowardice.  For 
instance, Randy Barnett wrote in The Washington Examiner that Roberts’s “maneuvers made 
constitutional law worse, even if they did save this law in hope of avoiding political attacks on 
the court.”  James Taranto, writing in The Wall Street Journal, acidly wondered whether Roberts 
had acted “as a finger-to-the-wind politician” basking in the “strange new respect” of liberals.8  
Taranto counseled Roberts “to reflect on . . . just how respectful it is to think of the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court [sic] as an easily bullied politician.”9  Mark Thiessen declared in The 
Washington Post that Roberts had “effectively redrafted the statute, making the mandate a tax in 
order to declare it constitutional.”10  He accused Roberts of “the kind of sophistry we expect 
from liberals,” and opined that conservatives “need jurists who have not only a philosophy of 
judicial restraint but the intestinal fortitude not to be swayed by pressure from the New York 
Times, the Georgetown cocktail circuit and the legal academy.”11 
The assessments of such constitutional defenders and critics differed significantly in 
obvious ways.  Yet there was subtle and substantial agreement lurking beneath the normative 
dissensus: Roberts’s defenders and critics appeared to share the belief that his decisive vote to 
uphold the ACA’s minimum coverage provision is best understood on non-legal grounds.  
Conservative critics eagerly claimed the mantle of legality for themselves, and some liberal 
defenders were quick to concede it.  Thus Toobin, while lavishing praise upon Roberts and four 
of his colleagues for doing “the right thing in one of the most important cases they will ever 
decide,” dismissed the Court’s tax-power rationale as “[f]rankly . . . not a persuasive one,” but 
“good enough for Roberts” because “[a]ny port will do in a constitutional storm.”12  Similarly, 
Rosen wrote that “[i]t would be easy, of course, to question the coherence of the combination of 
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legal arguments that Roberts embraced, but it would also be beside the point,” because 
“Roberts’s decision was above all an act of judicial statesmanship.”13 
Claims that Roberts acted politically (in either a bad or a good sense) in upholding the 
minimum coverage provision appear to go to his motives—to his reasons for deciding the case 
the way that he did.  So conceived, the question of whether Roberts’s opinion is law or politics is 
impossible to answer.  None of us knows why Roberts wrote the opinion that he wrote, and thus 
none of us can demonstrate that he was (or was not) politically motivated in whatever sense of 
“political” one has in mind.  If, however, acting politically means acting without adequate legal 
justification, then it is possible to assess Roberts’s performance.   
In this chapter, I will inquire whether the various parts of Roberts’s opinion on the 
minimum coverage provision are legally justifiable.  I will focus on what Roberts decided, not 
why he decided it that way.  I will therefore not opine on whether or why Roberts switched his 
vote, which is open to different interpretations and may turn substantially on which part(s) of his 
opinion one finds persuasive.  Nor will I focus on the Medicaid portion of Roberts’s opinion.  
The question of when, if ever, a federal financial incentive to the states tips from permissible 
temptation into unconstitutional coercion is sufficiently difficult that I will reserve my answer for 
future work. 
I believe that law is fully adequate to explain the Chief Justice’s vote to uphold the 
minimum coverage provision as within the scope of Congress’s power “[t]o lay and collect 
Taxes.”14  Roberts embraced the soundest constitutional understanding of the Taxing Clause.  He 
also showed fidelity to the law by applying—and not just giving lip service to—the deeply 
entrenched presumption of constitutionality that judges are supposed to apply when federal laws 
are challenged on federalism grounds.   
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Roberts’s opinion was unpersuasive in concluding that the minimum coverage provision 
was beyond the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  Roberts failed to 
apply the modern doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,” thereby needlessly deciding these 
questions.  What is more, he decided them wrongly.  Fortunately, the doctrinal consequences of 
this portion of his opinion will likely (although by no means certainly) prove insignificant.   
In the final part of this chapter, I move from the internal perspective of the faithful legal 
practitioner to the external perspective of the analyst of the constitutional system.  I ask what 
Roberts may have accomplished in responding to NFIB as he did.  By prohibiting Congress from 
requiring Americans to purchase products against their will, Roberts partially expressed new 
popular and professional constitutional arguments—arguments developed by those who had 
mobilized against the prevailing view among legal experts that the minimum coverage provision 
is constitutional.  By upholding the minimum coverage provision under the Taxing Clause, he 
validated the values of the ACA’s supporters and respected the post-New Deal convention that 
the Court should uphold momentous social welfare legislation.  By partially validating the 
sincerely held moral beliefs of both sides, Roberts may have succeeded in sustaining some 
measure of social solidarity amidst intense disagreement over health care reform, thereby 
enhancing the public legitimacy of constitutional law.   
Roberts may or may not have intended to practice judicial statesmanship, and his 
statesmanship may not be enough to justify his contradictions of sound legal reasoning.15  But 
statesmanship probably provides the most persuasive way to try to justify his analyses of the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  Such a defense, however, would require the 
application of criteria that are difficult to justify as legal from the internal point of view. 
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I. GOOD LAW 
 I will first consider the portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion that upheld the ACA’s 
minimum coverage provision as within the scope of Congress’s power to tax.  He wrote this part 
for the Court.   
A. The “Mandate” Is a Condition Attached to a Tax 
 
 Exhibit A for commentators who interpret Roberts’s opinion in political terms is his 
allegedly implausible conclusion that the minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility 
payment were within the scope of Congress’s tax power.  Such commentators wonder how that 
could be.  Congress not only referenced a “Requirement” to maintain minimum coverage and 
provided that every applicable individual “shall” obtain it,16 but also used the “penalty” label 
many times to describe the required payment for going without insurance.17   
 This objection emphasizes the seemingly mandatory language that Congress used in 
drafting the minimum coverage provision.  One possible response is that the provision 
nonetheless expresses a tax, not a penalty.  For example, Congress placed the required payment 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code, called individuals who must make the payment 
“taxpayers,” and calculated the amount of the payment in part based on the taxpayer’s household 
income for the taxable year.  Moreover, the statute requires taxpayers to indicate whether they 
have health insurance on their tax returns, and instructs the Internal Revenue Service to include 
the amount owed in the taxpayer’s tax return liability.18  Thus, Congress also used the language 
of taxation in drafting the minimum coverage provision.   
While the ACA’s defenders are right to stress this point, the ACA’s opponents still have 
the stronger argument regarding the expressive form of the provision.  The statutory language is 
closer to that of a penalty than a tax for two main reasons.  First, Congress used the words 
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“Requirement” and “shall.”  Second, Congress repeatedly called the exaction for noninsurance a 
“penalty” after labeling it a “tax” in earlier versions of the bill.19   
However one resolves this debate about expressive form, the ACA’s required payment 
for going without insurance is still a tax for purposes of the Taxing Clause, not a penalty.  To see 
why, it is most important to focus on the anticipated effects of the exaction.20  Ordinarily, the 
effects of an exaction are determined more by its material characteristics than by its expressive 
form.21  The material characteristics of the ACA’s required payment provision are plainly those 
of a tax, not a penalty.  First, the payment is less than the cost of insurance for many people—
indeed, for almost everyone.  By 2016, the annual exaction for noninsurance will be the greater 
of $695 or 2.5 percent of income, but not more than the average yearly premium for the 
minimum level of health insurance specified in the ACA. 22   Second, there is no scienter 
requirement; and third, the amount of the penalty does not go up each month or year that an 
individual goes without insurance.  Thus, an individual does not have to pay at an increasing rate 
for intentional or repeated failures to obtain health insurance.23 
Because of these material characteristics—Roberts called them “practical 
characteristics”24—the required payment will reduce the number of people who go without 
insurance without preventing such conduct, thereby raising several billion dollars in revenue 
each year.  The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that four million 
people each year will choose to make the shared responsibility payment instead of obtaining 
coverage.25  The CBO further predicts that the statute’s payment provision will produce $54 
billion in federal revenue from 2015 to 2022.26  
If the ACA had required a yearly payment of, say, $15,000 per uninsured person, then the 
payment would be a penalty, not a tax.  A $15,000 exaction would prevent almost everyone from 
	 7
going without insurance, and thus would raise little or no revenue.  Such an exaction would raise 
even less revenue if its amount went up by $5,000 each year that an individual remained 
uninsured.  Likewise, an initial “tax” of $25,000 on carrying a firearm in a school zone (with 
enhancements for intentionality and recidivism) would prevent such behavior and raise minimal 
revenue. 27   In distinguishing a tax from a penalty, the effect of a payment to the federal 
government on individual behavior matters most.  The so-called individual mandate is a modest 
financial incentive, not a coercive regulation.  It is not a pure tax in light of its expressive form, 
but it is a tax equivalent in light of its material characteristics and anticipated consequences.28  
Thus, it lies within Congress’s tax power. 
Constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent all indicate that it is constitutionally 
irrelevant whether Congress primarily intended to raise revenues or to regulate behavior in 
enacting the minimum coverage provision.29  The Constitution gives Congress the power to tax 
in order to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare.”30  Providing for the general 
welfare through taxation sometimes involves regulatory objectives.  Indeed, many federal 
exactions have long been intended to both raise revenues and regulate behavior, from the federal 
tax on imports at the time of the Founding to cigarette taxes today.31  Thus the modern Court has 
referenced approvingly “mixed-motive taxes that governments impose both to deter a disfavored 
activity and to raise money.”32    
Moreover, it is not decisive for purposes of the tax power whether Congress calls a 
required payment a tax.33  The Court has long de-emphasized the constitutional significance of 
the label that Congress uses to describe such payments.34  Just as Congress does not gain a power 
that it lacks by calling it a power that it has, so too does Congress not lose a power that it has by 
calling it a power that it lacks.  The expressive form of a required payment matters only to the 
	 8
extent that it affects individual behavior.35  To reiterate, the expressive form of the ACA’s shared 
responsibility payment as more a penalty than a tax will not tip the practical operation of the 
exaction from a tax to a penalty.  The amount imposed is sufficiently modest that many 
Americans are expected to pay it. 
  For some observers, however, the tax power rationale for the minimum coverage 
provision may still seem like a cheat.  Hadn’t opponents of the ACA framed the public debate in 
terms of the Commerce Clause?  Indeed, the label created by opponents—“individual 
mandate”—presupposes a regulation backed by a penalty, not a tax.  At oral argument, Justice 
Scalia deemed it “extraordinary” that the Solicitor General would invoke the tax power as an 
independently sufficient basis for the minimum coverage provision, with the implication that “all 
the discussion we had earlier about how this is one big uniform scheme and the Commerce 
Clause . . . really doesn’t matter.”36   
It is bedrock constitutional law, however, that the tax power is an independent source of 
constitutional authority.  The tax power may thus be available to Congress regardless of whether 
other sources of legislative authority are available, and regardless of how a debate is framed in 
the political arena.  Congress needed only one source of constitutional authority to justify the 
minimum coverage provision, and three were potentially available: the tax power, the power to 
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”37 and the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” other, concededly constitutional 
provisions of the ACA.38  The challengers, by contrast, had to win all three of their constitutional 
arguments.  The federal government’s reliance on the tax power was ordinary, not extraordinary. 
  What about political accountability?  Some argue that the federal government will avoid 
accountability if it may call an exaction a penalty in the political arena and a tax in court.39  But 
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political accountability in this context usually depends on who must pay and how much they 
must pay, not on what Congress calls what they must pay—which most people may not know 
anyway.  Neither President Obama nor the Democrats in the ACA Congress escaped political 
accountability for supporting the minimum coverage provision, which remains controversial.  
The expressive form of the ACA’s required payment provision does not appear to compromise 
political accountability.   
  More fundamentally, it is far from clear that political accountability is a judicially 
enforceable constitutional value in this setting.  I know of no constitutional authority for the 
assertion that Congress’s tax power is circumscribed by a requirement of accurate labeling, so 
that an exaction with the material characteristics and effects of a tax must be deemed a penalty in 
order to hold Congress accountable.  Federal commandeering of states, which the Court has held 
to violate the Tenth Amendment, is readily distinguishable.40  With commandeering, the federal 
government is requiring states to regulate individuals on its behalf.  With a purchase mandate or 
incentive, the federal government is itself regulating individuals.  
  Perhaps the Court has declined to impose such a “clear statement” requirement because 
the consequences would prove severe and destabilizing.  For example, many federal statutes 
have titles and preambles that misstate their contents, whether by labeling civilian spending 
“military” or by announcing public-regarding purposes for self-serving logrolls.  For decades, 
Congress has hidden tax breaks in the tax code instead of exposing them in the budget.41  The 
Court has never hinted that these practices raise constitutional concerns.  If the Court were to 
hold that the tax power justifies an exaction only if Congress calls it a “tax,” other kinds of 
mislabeling logically should also fall under such a requirement.  Policing these practices would 
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require a massive judicial undertaking, which presumably no member of the Roberts Court 
wishes to undertake.    
B. The Presumption of Constitutionality, Not Unconstitutionality 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Taxing Clause justifies the minimum coverage provision 
even without putting a judicial thumb on the scales in favor of acts of Congress.  Roberts, 
though, did not see it this way, which is why he stressed the legal principle of judicial deference 
to Congress in federalism cases.42  This principle requires judges to presume that federal laws are 
constitutional when they are challenged as beyond the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, 
and to practice constitutional avoidance by reading them in ways that render them constitutional 
if they can reasonably be so read.43  “[I]t is well established,” Roberts wrote in invoking the 
canon of constitutional avoidance, “that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which 
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”44   
Roberts did not just pay lip service to the presumption of constitutionality; he actually 
applied it in his tax power analysis, construing the minimum coverage provision as a tax because 
it “may reasonably be characterized as a tax.”45  “[B]ecause the Constitution permits such a tax,” 
he recognized, “it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”46  Roberts 
appropriately deferred to Congress even though he apparently did not share the political vision 
that produced the ACA.  “It is not our job,” he pointedly wrote, “to protect the people from the 
consequences of their political choices.”47 
II. BAD LAW 
 While Roberts’s analysis of the tax power was legally sound, the same cannot be said of 
his analyses of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  He offered unpersuasive legal 
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reasoning to justify why and how he was deciding that the minimum coverage provision was 
beyond the scope of these clauses.   
A. Constitutional Avoidance, Not Pursuit 
 Roberts did not need to decide whether the minimum coverage provision was within the 
scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  Nor did he need to decide whether 
the provision was a constitutionally “necessary and proper” measure to execute other 
congressional regulations of interstate commerce in the ACA.  To reiterate, Congress required 
only one source of constitutional authority to support the minimum coverage provision, and 
Roberts concluded that the provision was within the scope of the tax power. 
 Roberts explained that he was first deciding whether the minimum coverage provision 
was justified by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses because the provision “reads 
more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax.”48  He reasoned that he could not 
resort to the “saving construction” entailed in viewing the provision as a tax until he concluded 
that no other clause supported the provision.49 
 During the nineteenth century, Roberts’s legal reasoning would have been persuasive.  
Back then, the canon of “constitutional avoidance” in statutory interpretation was narrow: a 
judge was justified in construing a statute so as to save it from constitutional invalidation only 
after concluding that the statute would indeed be unconstitutional if read free of any such 
substantive canon.50  The problem for Roberts is that the modern avoidance canon is much 
broader than the classical canon he applied.51  The modern canon kicks in when a jurist has 
significant constitutional doubts about the constitutionality of a statutory provision.  The judge is 
supposed to engage in the saving construction if such a construction is reasonably available 
without initially deciding the constitutionality of the first-best reading of the statute.52  “‘If there 
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is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication,’” 
the Court stated as recently as 1999, “‘it is that we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.’”53    
 I cannot know why Roberts proceeded in this fashion.  Perhaps he simply confused 
classical avoidance with modern avoidance.  Perhaps he instead meant to reject modern 
avoidance.  Perhaps he made a factual mistake when he wrote that “[t]he Government asks us to 
interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution.”54  (The 
Government argued that the tax power provides an additional basis for upholding the minimum 
coverage provision, not an alternative basis.55)   
Whatever the explanation, Roberts’s legal reasoning on the avoidance question is 
unsatisfactory.  If he was embracing the classical avoidance canon going forward—perhaps in 
light of criticism of the modern canon56—then he owed the legal system an explanation to that 
effect in light of the rule-of-law values of guidance, predictability, reliance, and transparency.  If 
he was instead embracing old avoidance for this case only, such a move seems difficult to square 
with the rule-of-law requirement that judges discipline themselves to the virtue of consistency.57   
One might defend Roberts as having used dicta to reduce uncertainty.  The legal system 
now knows that he (and thus a majority of justices) accept a distinction between regulating and 
requiring commerce, and future Congresses can plan accordingly.  But this defense is just an 
argument for abandoning the modern canon of constitutional avoidance in favor of the classical 
canon, which Roberts did not do.  It is not a strong argument for applying the classical canon in 
this case only.  As I discuss below, it is unlikely that Congress would have imposed additional 
purchase mandates even if the Court had upheld the minimum coverage provision under the 
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Commerce Clause.  Accordingly, the legal system did not appear to require guidance concerning 
the validity of such mandates under the commerce power. 
B.  Interstate and Commerce, Necessary and Proper 
  Roberts not only decided constitutional questions that he did not need to decide.  He also 
decided them wrongly.  Under at least two decades of case law,58 the Commerce Clause justifies 
the minimum coverage provision because it regulates economic conduct that substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  Specifically, the provision regulates (through a financial incentive) how 
people pay for—or do not pay for—the health care that almost all of us inevitably consume and 
may not lawfully be denied, at a time we cannot predict, at a cost we may not be able to afford.59  
Americans who lack health insurance, as a general class, undeniably impact the costs borne by 
other participants in health care and insurance markets.  In passing the ACA, Congress found 
that, in 2008 alone, the uninsured shifted $43 billion in health care costs to health care providers, 
which “pass on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families.”60  Cost shifting is 
an economic problem, and its aggregate effects on interstate commerce are substantial.  
  The minimum coverage provision also finds support in recent normative scholarship on 
constitutional federalism, which stresses that Congress may invoke the Commerce Clause if it 
reasonably believes it is ameliorating a significant problem of collective action that exists 
“among the several States.”  This account offers a multi-generational synthesis and justification 
of post-New Deal and pre-NFIB case law.61  If Congress has no reasonable basis to believe that it 
is solving a significant collective action problem involving multiple states—whether races to the 
bottom or interstate spillovers—then Congress may not invoke its commerce power.62 
  Roberts stressed that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to force people into 
commerce.63  Even assuming (notwithstanding the cost shifting noted above) that the uninsured 
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as a general class are presently inactive in commerce, a proper Commerce Clause inquiry does 
not ask whether Congress is mandating private action.  Congress may mandate private action 
using its commerce power, just as it may otherwise regulate private action using its commerce 
power, to address a commercial problem of collective action facing the states—when the states 
are separately incompetent to solve the problem on their own because the scope of the problem 
disrespects state borders.  The states are separately incompetent when they impose significant 
costs on one another without paying for them. 
 The language of separate state incompetence comes from the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787.  The Convention instructed the midsummer Committee of Detail that Congress would 
be empowered to legislate in, among other things, “those Cases to which the States are separately 
incompetent.”64  This language originated in Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan.  The Committee 
of Detail changed the indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration closely 
resembling Article I, Section 8 as adopted.65   
  As Justice Ginsburg emphasized in one of the most important opinions of her career,66 
Congress reasonably concluded that the minimum coverage provision would ameliorate 
significant collective action problems involving multiple states.  Such problems arise when a 
financially able individual declines to purchase health insurance.  Such an individual can free 
ride on the benevolence of others in two ways.  First, because of federal and state laws and the 
charitable practices of most hospitals in the United States, other institutions and individuals will 
pay a significant share of the cost of stabilizing medical care rather than let an uninsured person 
go untreated.67  Second, even when the uninsured individual does not receive medical care for 
the time being, he benefits from the existence of the health care infrastructure and can rely on its 
availability in case of emergency.  Indeed, insurers must account for such reliance in pricing 
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policies.  A requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or pay for going without insurance 
is designed in part to overcome risk-taking in reliance on benevolence.  This rationale does not 
apply to uninsured individuals who are able to pay the full cost of their health care, but a severe 
injury or illness can bankrupt even wealthy individuals who lack insurance. 
  Theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that this free rider problem is 
interstate in scope—that this collective action problem involving individuals causes a collective 
action problem for the states.  For example, many insurance companies operate in multiple 
states, and many patients cross state lines to seek care at particular hospitals.  The costs that 
insurers must bear in one state may affect their ability to operate in more marginal markets in 
other states.  And millions of Americans have access to health care in states in which they do not 
reside.68  Congress could reasonably conclude that no one state can regulate these phenomena 
without imposing significant costs on other states, and that effective coordination among 
multiple state regulators is unlikely. 
  Turning to the Necessary and Proper Clause, it gives Congress the power to pass laws that 
are necessary and proper to carrying into execution Congress’s other enumerated powers.  It was 
common ground in the ACA litigation that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to 
prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions, canceling 
coverage absent fraud, charging higher premiums based on medical history, and imposing 
lifetime limits on benefits.69  These ACA provisions solve collective action problems for the 
states by facilitating labor mobility, discouraging the flight of insurers from states that guarantee 
insurance access to states that do not, and disincentivizing states from free riding on the more 
generous health care systems of sister states. 
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  Under established law, the minimum coverage provision is necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution these undeniably valid regulations of insurers.  “[T]he relevant inquiry is 
simply ‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end 
under the commerce power.’”70  Guaranteeing access to health insurance is a legitimate end, and 
the minimum coverage provision is reasonably adapted to the attainment of this end.  Without 
the minimum coverage provision, there would be a perverse incentive for uninsured, financially 
secure individuals to buy insurance only when they require expensive care, thereby free riding on 
people who pay for insurance when they are healthy.  This “adverse selection” problem would 
substantially undermine insurance markets.		   
  Notwithstanding this straightforward application of pre-existing law, Roberts created 
new limits on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  Regarding the commerce 
power, his opinion echoed Republican and Tea Party scare tactics about mandatory purchases of 
broccoli; 71  about losing “the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned;” 72  about 
“fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government;73 and 
about congressional use of the Commerce Clause as “a general license to regulate an individual 
from cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular transaction.”74  
Roberts thereby asserted that upholding the minimum coverage provision under the Commerce 
Clause would annihilate judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power.   
Rhetoric aside, Roberts’s opinion voiced the strongest argument of opponents of the 
minimum coverage provision, which is the perceived need for a judicially enforceable limiting 
principle on the commerce power.  A good response is that other judicially enforceable limits on 
the Commerce Clause would remain in place even if Roberts had rejected the novel distinction 
between regulating and requiring commerce.  These limits are evident in the above discussions 
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of pre-NFIB doctrine and collective action federalism.  They include the Court’s distinction 
between regulating economic conduct and regulating non-economic conduct, and the functional 
distinction between problems that require collective action by states and problems that states can 
solve on their own.75   
These limits would not prohibit Congress from ever imposing a purchase mandate, nor is 
there any good reason that they should.  But these limits would rule out some of the scarier 
hypotheticals crafted by opponents of the ACA, such as forced purchases of broccoli or gym 
memberships on the ground that healthier citizens impose fewer health care costs on others.  The 
causal relationship between such purchases and good health is highly speculative and attenuated 
when the regulated individuals do not want to buy the good or service in question.  That is not 
the case concerning the relationship between possession of health insurance and cost shifting in 
health care markets.  Health insurance is how most of us routinely pay for health care. 
Roberts also ignored the political safeguards of federalism, which often count in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  Political constraints, not judicially enforceable limits, prevent Congress 
from raising the minimum wage to $1,000 per hour.  Political realism ensures that Congress will 
not prohibit people from purchasing unhealthy foods—or vegetables for that matter—even 
though the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine allows Congress to enact such fundamental 
changes in the relationship between the citizen and the federal government.  Registering 
appropriate concerns about constitutional limits requires the human faculty of judgment—an 
ability to distinguish real threats to constitutional values from mere shadows.   
As for the Necessary and Proper Clause, Roberts seemed to concede that the minimum 
coverage provision was necessary (that is, convenient or useful) to effectuate the admittedly 
constitutional ACA provisions that require insurers to cover people with pre-existing conditions.  
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He nonetheless concluded that the provision was improper.76  It was improper, as best I can 
discern, because it violated a new structural limit on federal power that disables Congress from 
compelling people to buy a product.  He deemed such compulsion the exercise of a “‘great 
substantive and independent power’” beyond those specifically enumerated, not an exercise of 
authority “derivative of, and in service to, a granted power.”77   
I do not understand why that is so.  The minimum coverage provision is a means to the 
end of guaranteeing people access to health insurance without unraveling insurance markets. 
This rationale for the provision is narrower than the Commerce Clause theory because it requires 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and because many markets do not even arguably suffer 
from adverse selection problems.  So the adverse selection rationale is another limiting principle 
that Roberts could have elected to embrace.   
With respect to both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, Roberts’s new 
constitutional prohibition on purchase mandates appears to lack a sound basis in constitutional 
text, history, structure, or precedent.78  Nor does it seem grounded in a sensible functional 
understanding of the vertical division of powers in a federal system.  If states may impose 
purchase mandates when commercial problems are intrastate in scope, why may not Congress 
impose them when such problems are interstate in scope?  “The authority of the federal 
government over interstate commerce,” the Court instructed in the landmark case of United 
States v. Darby, “does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over 
intrastate commerce.”79 
C. Doctrinal Implications 
 Fortunately for the integrity of constitutional law, Roberts’s interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause (which the four dissenters share) seems unlikely to prove significant. 
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Congress never used the Commerce Clause to impose purchase mandates prior to the ACA—it 
actually imposed only a purchase incentive in the ACA—and it is unlikely to impose a purchase 
mandate in the future.  Purchase mandates are politically unpopular, and Congress has a variety 
of other means to achieve its objectives.  The parade of horribles invoked by opponents of the 
ACA—from forcing Americans to purchase broccoli to compelling them to buy American cars—
seemed to have more to do with persuading the Court to invalidate the minimum coverage 
provision (and the entire ACA) than with future congressional legislation.   
Roberts’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause may prove more 
consequential, partly because the four dissenters went even further in restricting the scope of this 
power.  It is hard to know what will happen, however, because Roberts’s language is vague and 
difficult to apply.  Going forward, how should Congress and the courts distinguish between a 
“‘great substantive and independent power’” beyond those enumerated in the Constitution, and a 
power merely “derivative of, and in service to, a granted power”?80   
I suspect, although I cannot prove, that Roberts wrote this part of his opinion for this case 
only, not for the future.  Having just denied Congress the power to impose purchase mandates 
under the Commerce Clause, he may have been determined not to allow such mandates under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Quoting selectively from McCulloch v. Maryland, 81  while 
ignoring most of its language and structural logic, Roberts may have been insisting that Congress 
may not impose a purchase mandate under the Necessary and Proper Clause if Congress may not 
impose one under the Commerce Clause.  Such a rationale risks denying the undeniable—that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is an independent source of constitutional authority—but the 
damage may prove modest partly for this reason.   
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Moreover, following through on what Roberts wrote to justify his conclusion might have 
radical implications.  If a requirement to buy a product is always a great substantive and 
independent power, then perhaps Congress has long used the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
exercise other great substantive and independent powers, from creating a national bank to 
deporting people.  Federal power to charter corporations was so controversial at the time of the 
Founding that the Framers declined to vote on whether to grant Congress such authority.82  
Moreover, deportation is not obviously derivative of the power to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization.83  Roberts likely did not contemplate that his analysis might call into question the 
constitutionality of a national bank or deportations by the federal government—or, for that 
matter, criminal laws whose violation can result in long prison terms or execution.  Unlike the 
joint dissenters in NFIB, he had recently joined all of Justice Breyer’s broad interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in United States v. Comstock.84   
My best guess is that the commerce and necessary and proper portions of Roberts’s 
opinion will come to be regarded as exercises in symbolic federalism.  I read Roberts as 
prohibiting Congress from imposing purchase mandates, not as prohibiting Congress from ever 
regulating “inactivity” under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause.  Federal 
power to quarantine or mandate vaccination might be critical in a public health emergency, such 
as a flu pandemic that disrespects state borders. 
Of course, I cannot be certain that the Roberts opinion will be limited to purchase 
mandates.  If I am wrong, then the consequences could be quite significant.  For example, given 
the conceptual instability of the distinction between regulating “activity” and regulating 
“inactivity,” it is possible that a differently composed Court will use the Roberts opinion (and the 
joint dissent) to aggressively scale back the scope of federal power.  But given how extreme it 
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would be to conclude, say, that a restaurant owner who refuses to serve African Americans is 
“inactive” in commerce for constitutional purposes, I doubt we will end up in such a place.  
Parties that practiced racial discrimination infamously made such claims in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States85 and Katzenbach v. McClung,86 in which the Court held that the 
Commerce Clause justified provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibited racial 
discrimination in hotels and restaurants.  My sense of the Chief Justice, who presumably will be 
on the Court for decades, is that he has no desire to go there.  He is too much of a believer in 
judicial deference to acts of Congress.	
III. OUTSIDE LAW 
I have so far occupied the perspective of the faithful legal practitioner, who has views 
about sound and unsound constitutional arguments.  In this final Part, I will occupy the external 
perspective of the analyst of the constitutional system.  I will ask what Chief Justice Roberts may 
have accomplished in responding to NFIB as he did.  I will focus on the possible effects of his 
intervention, not on whether he intended those effects.  As I noted at the outset, no one knows 
why he did what he did.   
What may Roberts have accomplished by prohibiting Congress from using the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to require Americans to purchase products against 
their will?  Any answer to this question is necessarily speculative at this point.  The effects of a 
Supreme Court decision are a matter of empirical causation, which may be difficult to measure 
and may depend on whether one focuses on the short term or the long term.87  There may also be 
a difference between the effects of judicial speech on elite opinion and the effects on public 
opinion, even if the latter is partially a function of the former.  I cannot do more here than note 
these difficulties and proceed anyway. 
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In validating a legal position that was widely dismissed as near-frivolous just two years 
earlier, 88  Roberts expressed new popular and professional constitutional arguments.  These 
arguments were developed by those who had mobilized against the predominant view among 
legal experts that the minimum coverage provision is constitutional.  These experts including 
some of the most prominent legal conservatives in the nation, such as Charles Fried, Henry 
Monaghan, Richard Posner, Laurence Silberman, Jeffrey Sutton, and J. Harvie Wilkinson III.   
Many millions of Americans balked at being forced by Congress to buy a product.89  
Perhaps they were misinformed about the rationales for the minimum coverage provision, given 
that the ACA provisions requiring insurers to cover individuals with pre-existing conditions 
remain very popular.90  And perhaps much of the public was misinformed because so much more 
money was spent attacking the law than defending it.91  But it can be perilous to dismiss the 
opposition of a majority of Americans over a sustained period of time on grounds of public 
ignorance.  Perhaps the Obama Administration would have defended the ACA more vigorously 
in the court of public opinion if doing so had entailed less political risk.92   
Republican and libertarian lawyers acted in harmony, and in concert, with the popular 
constitutional commitments of groups that had mobilized against the minimum coverage 
provision.  These lawyers conceptualized Congress’s enumerated powers in libertarian terms.  
The best instance may have been Randy Barnett’s ingenious argument that the minimum 
coverage provision “commandeered the people,” thereby turning citizens into “subjects.”93  From 
the standpoint of orthodox legal reasoning, it would have made more sense to present this 
liberty-based, freedom-from-contract objection to the minimum coverage provision as an 
economic substantive due process claim.94  From the standpoint of conventional legal reasoning, 
it makes little sense from either a federalism or a liberty perspective to invalidate the minimum 
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coverage provision while conceding that a more centralizing and coercive single-payer system of 
Medicare for all is clearly constitutional.95  But from the standpoint of emerging and contrarian 
constitutional arguments, such observations may be beside the point.  In rejecting the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses as justifications for the minimum coverage provision, 
Roberts’s opinion was congruent with mobilization claims on the Republican right.   
But Roberts’s opinion also differed from these mobilization claims.  By upholding the 
minimum coverage provision under the Taxing Clause, Roberts validated the commitments of 
the ACA’s supporters, including the president and the political party that he leads.  In addition, 
Roberts honored what Adrian Vermeule has identified as a fundamental post-New Deal 
constitutional convention: “the Court should not invalidate major social welfare statutes enacted 
by the federal government.”96  The ACA is deadly serious business.  Almost all Americans will 
be personally affected by the legislation, just as they would have been personally affected by the 
Court’s invalidation of it.  The ACA is much closer to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid 
than it is to any federal law invalidated by the Rehnquist Court on federalism grounds.  A 
principal effect of Roberts’s intervention was that the Court avoided striking down—by a vote of 
five Republicans to four Democrats—much or all of the most important piece of domestic 
legislation in nearly half a century.   
Roberts did not give the ACA’s opponents and proponents half a loaf: opponents lost this 
part of the case and won a limit on federal commerce power that seems unlikely to come into 
play much in the future.  But Roberts did accept their key constitutional, moral, and symbolic 
claim: Congress may not coerce people into commerce the better to regulate them.  Whether 
intentionally or unwittingly, Roberts partially validated the sincerely held moral beliefs of both 
sides.  This is precisely what Professor Paul Mishkin understood Justice Powell to have 
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accomplished when the Court initially established constitutional standards for affirmative action 
in higher education.97  Like Powell in the Bakke case,98 Roberts thereby may have helped to 
sustain some measure of social solidarity amidst intense disagreement over the meaning of the 
Constitution—and of the nation’s commitments to the general welfare and individual liberty.  
Justices sometimes respond to momentous cases by practicing judicial statesmanship. 
They “seek not only the ‘right answer’ to legal questions as a matter of professional reason but 
also an answer that sustains the social legitimacy of law.”99  Such judges take some account of 
the conditions of the public legitimacy of the constitutional law that they craft.  They may 
succeed in sustaining the public legitimacy of constitutional law by fashioning judicial opinions 
that express social values as social circumstances change, and by sustaining social solidarity 
amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement.  Statesmanship is political in the sense of 
attempting to secure the political foundations of the rule of law,100 which requires attention to the 
subtle relationships of “trust” that make the rule of law possible.101  Statesmanship is not political 
in the “low politics” sense of seeking partisan advantage.102 
To be clear, I have underscored some possible consequences of Roberts’s conduct from 
the external perspective, and I have noted its similarity to the practice of judicial statesmanship.  
I have not approved his commerce and necessary-and-proper analyses from the internal 
perspective.  I am loath to endorse these parts of Roberts’s opinion on grounds of statesmanship 
because I believe that they contradict sound legal reasoning.  If one were going to defend these 
portions of his opinion, however, statesmanship likely would provide the most persuasive means 
of doing so.  But such a defense would entail the application of criteria that sound in social 
solidarity and judicial legitimacy, which are difficult to justify as legal from the internal point of 
view.103   
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As I observed at the beginning of this chapter, liberal supporters of the ACA praised 
Roberts’s judicial statesmanship in upholding the minimum coverage provision under the Taxing 
Clause.  If the foregoing account of Roberts’s conduct is persuasive, then these commentators 
were right to stress his statesmanship, but wrong to locate it exclusively in his reliance on the tax 
power.  Such statesmanship also lay in his conclusions that the minimum coverage provision was 
beyond the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 
A focus on judicial statesmanship does not suggest that Roberts disbelieved his own 
interpretations of these two clauses.  To reiterate, I am examining the potential effects of his 
intervention, not whether he intended those effects.  Moreover, Roberts easily could have 
believed his interpretations of these clauses even if he intended to practice statesmanship.  
Statesmanship might then explain why he needlessly decided these questions, not whether he 
believed in the soundness of the resolutions that he reached. 
 This account of Roberts’s statesmanship in NFIB may seem most persuasive to those who 
agree with me on the merits—that is, those who think the tax part of his opinion is right and the 
commerce and necessary-and-proper parts are wrong.  I am not so sure.  Although views about 
judicial statesmanship are not entirely independent of views about the merits,104 nor are the two 
co-extensive.  For example, one might agree with certain liberal defenders of the ACA’s 
constitutionality that Roberts’s opinion is statesman like for the reasons I have offered while still 
concluding that all three parts of his opinion on the minimum coverage provision are wrong.  
One could also appreciate the potentially positive systemic effects of his intervention even after 
concluding that legality required him to invalidate the minimum coverage provision. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
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There is adequate legal justification for Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that the 
minimum coverage provision was within the scope of Congress’s tax power.  There is inadequate 
legal justification for why and how Roberts concluded that the minimum coverage provision was 
beyond the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  But in partially 
responding to conservative mobilization against the ACA, Roberts may have practiced judicial 
statesmanship—not just by upholding the minimum coverage provision under the Taxing Clause, 
but also by rejecting it under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  The ACA’s 
opponents thereby won something, even if mostly symbolic, in their quest to defeat health care 
reform.   
It is difficult to approve this facet of Roberts’s opinion if one believes, as I do, that the 
minimum coverage provision is a valid regulation of interstate commerce, as well as a 
constitutionally appropriate means of effectuating other valid regulations of interstate commerce.  
But to the extent that Roberts succeeded in enhancing the social legitimacy of constitutional law, 
this consequence of his opinion should, perhaps, give some pause to those inclined to judge him 
in exclusively legal terms—and to judge him harshly.  American constitutional discourse 
requires resources to distinguish the different senses in which judges may act “politically.”  
Statesmanship and partisanship are not the same.   
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